There are certain place names that have become synonymous
with the appalling events that occurred there: Auschwitz, Amritsar –
Srebrenica. On 7 July 1995 – twenty
years ago this week – the Bosnian Serb Army overran the town of Srebrenica in
Eastern Bosnia and proceeded over the following days to massacre over 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and
boys. The town and its surrounding areas
had been declared a United Nations Safe Area back in April 1993. It was anything but.
The trapped and half-starved population were protected by a
small Dutch UN battalion armed only with light weapons and a few APCs. When the first shells landed within the
Srebrenica Safe Area on 6 July 1995, nobody was surprised. For the past two
years the Bosnian Serb forces had kept the enclave encircled, shelling and
sniping sporadically at the civilian population and the Dutchbat troops,
waiting for the international community to tire of their effort to keep the
enclaves on life support. The Serbs had been waiting for their moment, and
everyone knew it. The fall of Srebrenica had been almost inevitable from the
moment it was first declared a Safe Area.
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Recovered bodies awaiting re-burial in 2010 |
The events are as controversial today as they were
then. A UK-sponsored attempt to pass a
UN Security Council resolution officially defining the massacre as genocide has
caused outcry amongst Bosnian Serbs. Srebrenica is now situated in the state-within-a-state of Republika Srpska and despite
being the only town in the region with a Bosniak mayor, barely masks still-simmering ethnic tensions. Some Bosnian Serbs are angry that their own
war dead are not commemorated in the same way; others deny that the massacre
even took place. 7,132 bodies have been
recovered from mass graves and reburied; over a thousand are still
missing, causing unendurable agony for their surviving relatives. Despite a court ruling absolving the Dutch
troops of any blame for the massacre, many still hold them to account for allowing
the Bosnian Serb forces to take the Safe Area and for failing to protect the
Bosniak population.
So why, exactly, did a supposed Safe Area end up as the scene
of the worst massacre in Europe since the Second World War?
Simply put, the Safe Areas should never have been created in the first
place. When the Serbs had the town surrounded in March 1993 they offered to let
the Muslims go to the relatively safe, government held city of Tuzla and General
Phillipe Morillon, Commander of the UN Forces in Bosnia at that time, began to
make plans for such an evacuation. However, both the Bosnian government and UN
Security Council refused. The Bosnian government
objected to the planned evacuation because it believed Srebrenica could later
be exchanged for Serb-held suburbs of Sarajevo. The international community, on
the other hand, opposed the scheme because the Vance-Owen Peace Plan placed
Srebrenica in a Muslim canton, and to allow the Serbs to take the town would
be, as they saw it, to acquiesce to ethnic cleansing. The outrage of an
anti-Serb press shamed the Security Council into passing an essentially
meaningless resolution – Resolution 836 - which did little to make Srebrenica a
safe area because the member states lacked the political will to follow through
on the sentiments invested in the Safe Area resolutions.
The Security Council required peacekeepers to play a
war-fighting role, whilst failing to provide them with the weaponry or manpower
to do so. They assigned UNPROFOR a mandate which, even if only symbolically,
aligned them with the Bosnian Muslims, but expected them to continue to rely on
Bosnian Serb consent to deliver humanitarian aid. Not only did the Safe Area resolutions
conflict with previous resolutions, they also contradicted themselves, leading
to widely different interpretations. Resolution
836 did not clearly state when air support could be called in, and the use of
the word ‘deter’ instead of ‘defend’ left the Safe Areas semantically
unprotected. Both the UNPROFOR command and the Dutchbat soldiers within the
Srebrenica enclave were left confused as to what they were expected to do.
Once the Safe Areas were created, however, it was only a
matter of time before the
Serbs decided to attack. Srebrenica was not betrayed by any formal agreement, but merely by a failure to make any real effort to stop
the Serb offensive. Despite a number of deals to sacrifice Srebrenica being considered by the Bosnian government,
there is no evidence that any took place.
There is also no concrete evidence of a deal over the use of air power
that UNPROFOR Commander Lieutenant-General Bernard Janvier was rumoured to have
made with Bosnian Serb military leader Ratko Mladić.
Srebrenica fell because of a lack of will to fight for it on
the part of the Bosnian government and the ARBiH, and because UNPROFOR had
neither the manpower nor the mandate to defend it. It is possible that earlier
use of Close Air Support could have saved the enclave (bungled complications
with faxes lead to farcical delays in the arrival of UN planes), but ultimately
the UN did not want to provoke the Serbs for fear of reprisals against Dutch
hostages taken earlier by Bosnian Serb forces.
Taking UN hostages had been a tactic favoured by the BSA
throughout the war, used to humiliate the international community as well
as a bargaining chip against greater military reprisals.
Srebrenica was one of three eastern Bosnian towns declared
UN Safe Areas. After Srebrenica fell,
the towns of Goražde and Žepa suffered the same fate shortly after. The problem of the eastern enclaves – pockets
of Bosnian Muslims amongst Serb-held territory - had been plaguing peace
negotiations for months. Their fall
simplified the political map and made a territorial settlement possible. If the horrendous massacre had not followed,
the fall of Srebrenica would probably have been viewed as an ill-advised
mandate leading to a military disaster, and not the terrible catastrophe it
ultimately became. Tragically for
Srebrenica and its inhabitants, it was politically expedient to allow the Safe
Area to fall.
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Refugees from Srebrenica arrive in Tuzla in 1995 |
Could those Dutch soldiers have ever imagined what would
happen next? There is no doubt, from
their testimonies and records, that many of them have been psychologically
scarred by it. As the Bosnian Serb
forces closed in on the town, the population fled to nearby Potočari, where the
UN battalion had its headquarters. They
were denied entry to the UN compound.
Instead they were handed over to Ratko Mladić and his troops, who
promised them safe passage to government-held territory. Subsequently, the men – including the very elderly
and adolescent boys – were separated from the women and children. Many men and boys attempted to flee to safety
through the mountains, but they were malnourished from two years of siege and
safe territory was many miles away. Few
made it. Those who did not were rounded up along with the others and shot, and their bodies bulldozed into mass graves.
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The Srebrenica Memoial Centre at Potočari, opened in 2003 |